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In this insightful and well-argued article, W. Robert Thomas sets out to 
make progress on a long-standing problem for corporate criminal law: namely, 
the difficulties presented by using fines as the primary method of punishing 
corporations.1 Thomas convincingly argues that corporate criminal fines do not 
do a particularly good job of promoting the goals of criminal punishment—i.e. 
deterrence, coupled with retributivist ends and the expression of societal 
condemnation.2 He then defends a proposal for how corporate law can be 
reformed to enable corporate criminal fines to more effectively serve such 
goals.3 The result is a concrete and promising policy reform. 
In this Response, I raise a number of critical questions for Thomas’s 
arguments. Most importantly, several versions of Thomas’s policy proposal are 
available, and one wonders why these alternatives would not be at least as 
desirable as the version Thomas himself endorses. In Parts I and II, I briefly 
recap the basics of Thomas’s argument. Then in Part III, I subject them to a bit 
of critical scrutiny. Ultimately, Thomas’s proposal is intriguing, and the aim of 
this Response is simply to continue the important conversation Thomas has 
begun.  
                                                                                                                     
  Reader (Associate Professor), University of Surrey School of Law. 
 1 See generally W. Robert Thomas, The Ability and Responsibility of Corporate Law 
to Improve Criminal Fines, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 601 (2017).  
 2 Id. at 608–09. 
 3 Id. at 607–08. 
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I. THE BASIC PROBLEMS WITH CORPORATE CRIMINAL FINES 
To begin with, Thomas seeks to sidestep a number of well-worn theoretical 
questions about the legitimacy of corporate criminal punishment. For one, he 
deftly evades thorny theoretical debates about whether corporations are the right 
kind of entity to be punished by the criminal law.4 Spoiler alert: Thomas shows 
that there is scant reason to doubt that they are.5 What is more, he attempts to 
circumvent the familiar “spillover objection” to corporate criminal fines.6 This 
is the worry that because corporate criminal fines harm shareholder value even 
when the shareholders themselves are not blameworthy actors, such fines violate 
“negative retributivism”—that is, the principle that punishment is just only if it 
harms culpable actors in proportion to their desert.7 Thomas is unimpressed with 
this objection because the problem is not “unique to corporate punishment.”8 
Individual punishment, after all, also routinely harms innocent parties.9 
Instead of fretting over these familiar theoretical objections to corporate 
criminal fines, Thomas is chiefly concerned with the more pressing practical 
problems that such fines encounter. The first main group has to do with the 
deterrent value of corporate criminal fines.10 One of their limitations is that they 
cease to be effective as deterrents as the corporation subjected to them moves 
closer to insolvency—a problem known as the “deterrence trap.”11 Even more 
troublingly, fines do not deter managers particularly well because fines levied 
on the corporation are effectively paid with shareholder money.12 Thomas 
quotes Larry Summers’ observation that “[m]anagers do not find it personally 
costly to part with even billions of dollars of their shareholders’ money.”13  
The second main group of problems concerns the inability of fines to 
adequately express society’s condemnation of corporate crimes.14 As Thomas 
puts it, “the expressive problem with corporate–criminal fines is that there is 
nothing uniquely criminal” about them.15 After all, they are practically speaking 
                                                                                                                     
 4 Id. at 608. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 618. 
 7 See Mitchell N. Berman, The Justification of Punishment, in THE ROUTLEDGE 
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 141, 150–51 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012) 
(distinguishing positive and negative retributivism). 
 8 Thomas, supra note 1, at 619. 
 9 Id. at 617–18. 
 10 Id. at 610. 
 11 Id. at 611 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 
390 (1981)). 
 12 Id.  
 13 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lawrence Summers, Companies on Trial: Are 
They ‘Too Big to Jail’?, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e3bf9954-
7009-11e4-90af-00144feabdc0.html [https://perma.cc/ZCD7-Q6FT]). 
 14 Thomas, supra note 1, at 614. 
 15 Id. at 617. 
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indistinguishable from civil fines or any other event that negatively impacts the 
bottom-line.16 A “corporation absorbs the cost of a criminal fine in exactly the 
same way that it absorbs any other business cost—a civil fine, for example, or 
even just an exogenous shock from a bad investment.”17 As a result, it is no 
wonder that “corporations treat fines simply as ‘the cost of doing business.’”18 
However, this conflicts with the axiom that punishments are meant to express 
the strongest form of condemnation of which society is able.19 
II. THOMAS’S SOLUTION: A CORPORATE–CRIME CLAWBACK 
To remedy these problems with corporate criminal fines, Thomas offers an 
intriguing proposal. Granted, it is only meant to illustrate the ways in which 
corporate law reforms can be fruitfully used to tackle pressing problems with 
punishing corporations—an important contribution that Thomas makes to the 
literature, to be sure.20 Nonetheless, because the proposal is clearly and 
vigorously defended, it also bears closer scrutiny. 
Thomas’s proposal consists of two components. First, he advocates 
modifying criminal fines so that the default rule is that the directorship is held 
jointly and severally liable for the entire cost of the corporate criminal fine (with 
rights of contribution).21 Second, he thinks this initially harsh-seeming change 
should be tempered by a corporate–crime clawback bylaw, which allows 
directors to decrease their personal exposure by clawing back funds from 
managers and other high-level employees to the extent that they were 
responsible for the crime of which the corporation is convicted.22 The sort of 
clawback that Thomas envisions should not be used to target earned income, but 
rather only incentive compensation like bonuses or stock options.23 
Under this double-barreled policy reform, corporate criminal fines would 
be significantly more defensible—i.e. would further the ends of the criminal law 
more effectively—than is the case under the existing regime.24 For one thing, 
making directors individually liable for corporate criminal fines carries deterrent 
benefits.25 After all, directors are in a better position than shareholders to affect 
the behavior of managers or other employees and thereby prevent criminal 
misconduct from occurring in the first place.26 Moreover, this also would 
                                                                                                                     
 16 Id. at 616. 
 17 Id. at 616–17 (footnote omitted). 
 18 Id. at 614. 
 19 Id. at 614–15. 
 20 Thomas, supra note 1, at 602. 
 21 Id. at 645–46. 
 22 Id. at 647–48. 
 23 Id. at 648. 
 24 Id. at 657.  
 25 Id. at 647.  
 26 Thomas, supra note 1, at 647 (“[D]irectors are better positioned than shareholders to 
detect and prevent criminal misconduct.”). 
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establish a stark difference between a) corporate criminal fines, which would 
fall on directors in the first instance, and b) civil fines, which would be absorbed 
by shareholders in the same way as any other cost to the corporation.27 As a 
result of this difference, corporate criminal fines would be better able to express 
a strong and uniquely criminal form of condemnation.28 
III. QUESTIONS 
Thomas’s corporate–crime clawback is an intriguing policy proposal with 
which I am very sympathetic. Nonetheless, the details merit closer investigation. 
In this Part, I raise three groups of questions about the specifics of how the 
policy is developed and defended.  
A. Why Not Some Other Version of the Clawback? 
To begin with, it would be helpful to hear more from Thomas about why his 
proposed corporate–crime clawback policy reform would only apply to 
directors—as opposed to other groups of stakeholders. Let us consider two 
alternative versions of his proposal in more detail. 
1. Shareholders 
One alternative worth considering, since it would require less radical 
reforms, would be to apply an analog of Thomas’s clawback proposal to 
shareholders. Thomas points out that, under the existing regime, shareholders 
by default are the ones who absorb the costs of corporate criminal fines.29 The 
trouble, he points out, is that shareholders do not have very powerful tools at 
their disposal to control the conduct of directors, managers or other 
employees.30 However, this could be at least partially remedied by extending 
the second component of Thomas’s proposal to shareholders: specifically, by 
instituting clawback mechanisms that would allow shareholders (or perhaps 
only certain classes thereof) to recoup the costs of corporate criminal fines from 
the directors, managers or other employees who are found to be responsible for 
the underlying criminal conduct (either by committing it, encouraging it, or 
failing to prevent it). To facilitate efficiency, such clawbacks could be 
accomplished through the same sort of internal procedures that Thomas 
discusses,31 rather than through time-consuming and costly lawsuits.  
If Thomas’s goal is to provide more effective ways for different 
stakeholders in the corporation to negotiate about how the harm of a corporate 
                                                                                                                     
 27 Id. at 646–47. 
 28 Id. at 645. 
 29 Id. at 616–17. 
 30 Id. at 647–48 (“[U]nder the status quo shareholders have at best weak mechanisms 
to influence director activity.”). 
 31 Id. at 648–49. 
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criminal punishment will be distributed,32 why not give the tools he envisions 
directly to shareholders? The benefit this would confer is that it seems to largely 
obviate the need for the first component of Thomas’s policy proposal—namely, 
the initial step of making directors jointly and severally liable for corporate 
criminal fines.33 As a result, this more rudimentary version of Thomas’s 
proposal would seem to constitute a smaller departure from the status quo. I do 
not claim this alternative proposal necessarily is superior to the version Thomas 
endorses. Rather, I only mean to point out that to accomplish a full defense of 
his proposal, it would be helpful to hear more about why his bolder proposal is 
superior to this more bare-bones version. 
One possible answer that Thomas might avail himself of here is to claim 
that his version of the proposal, which applies only to directors, would offer 
better deterrence of corporate criminal misconduct than the shareholder version 
I’ve just outlined. Nonetheless, it is not obvious that this is the case. After all, if 
shareholders can claw back the costs of corporate criminal fines directly from 
the responsible parties within the corporation, we also can expect better 
deterrence of corporate crime than under the status quo, where shareholders can 
do nothing but bear the costs of fines. Thus, at the end of the day, this answer 
turns on an empirical claim, which may prove difficult to evaluate from the 
armchair.  
In any event, it would be interesting to hear more about why making the 
clawback option available only to directors is preferable to offering it to 
shareholders directly.  
2. Managers 
While one question is why Thomas’s proposal is to be preferred to a 
somewhat less radical alternative, there is also the converse question about 
whether Thomas’s proposal perhaps should go further than he envisions. In 
particular, why not establish a default rule that joint and several liability for 
corporate criminal fines should apply to both directors and certain groups of 
high-value employees with managerial responsibility? In other words, why not 
change the default rule so that not only directors, but also managers should be 
held jointly and severally liable for corporate criminal fines in the first instance?  
If Thomas’s proposal is justified in part on the basis of enhanced deterrence 
of misconduct,34 one wonders why there wouldn’t be a stronger deterrence 
argument for applying his proposal not just to directors but also to managers. 
Similarly, one suspects that extending the proposal in this way could also 
strengthen the expressive force of corporate criminal fines by placing the burden 
of the punishment on a greater number of responsible actors. Finally, this 
expanded proposal might have the additional salutary effect of increasing the 
                                                                                                                     
 32 Thomas, supra note 1, at 648. 
 33 Id. at 645–46. 
 34 Id. at 647. 
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likelihood that the victims of corporate crime would be fully compensated. By 
increasing the number of actors who are jointly and severally liable in the first 
instance, there is a smaller chance that victims will not be able to locate a 
sufficient number of deep pockets from which to claim compensation.  
Thomas’s proposal thus occupies a middle ground between the less radical 
shareholder clawback proposal and the expanded version that applies to both 
directors and managers. The case in favor of Thomas’s own proposal would be 
strengthened if we were to hear more about why the middle position he occupies 
is superior to either of these alternatives.  
B. Contingent Expressive Benefits 
Thomas argues that one of the benefits of his proposal is that it would mark 
a clear difference between corporate criminal fines and civil fines, such that the 
former express a more serious form of condemnation than the latter.35 However, 
one might have worries about whether this difference is sufficiently robust to 
establish a fundamental difference in kind between criminal condemnation and 
civil liability.  
The trouble is this: Suppose Thomas’s proposal is implemented and proves 
to be successful in reducing the incidence of misconduct within corporations. In 
this event, it seems very likely that support would emerge for incorporating 
similar tools into civil law as well. If one achieves greater deterrence by 
imposing joint and several liability for criminal fines on directors, then civil law 
reformers would of course take note and become interested in following up on 
that success themselves. After all, deterrence of misconduct is an important goal 
of civil liability as well.  
Thus, the deterrence argument for Thomas’s proposal on the criminal side 
may also end up supporting the imposition of civil liability directly on the 
directorship as well. Is it realistic to expect the private law to simply decline to 
adopt an effective deterrent mechanism simply to preserve the expressive force 
of corporate criminal fines? I suspect not. As a result, one worries that the 
success of Thomas’s proposal would inevitably lead one of the main selling 
points of his view—its difference from civil law—to evaporate.36  
C. The Spillover Problem Revisited 
Finally, Thomas’s discussion of the spillover problem deserves more careful 
consideration.37 In my view, his clawback proposal is not undermined by the 
spillover problem. However, this is actually for simpler reasons than he 
suggests. 
                                                                                                                     
 35 Id.  
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 618–19. 
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Recall the way in which Thomas deals with the spillover problem. As seen 
above, Thomas initially attempts to defuse the problem by offering a “partners 
in guilt” response. He argues that although traditional corporate criminal fines 
end up burdening innocent parties—namely, shareholders—this is not fatal 
because this sort of spillover onto the innocent is not “unique to corporate 
punishment.”38 Individual punishment, too, can harm the innocent, as when a 
child is deprived of support and comfort when her single parent is sentenced to 
jail time.39 
Nonetheless, it is not clear that this is a sufficient answer to the present 
problem across the board. For one thing, one might reply that if punishments 
routinely spill over onto the innocent in violation of negative retributivism, then 
our criminal law would routinely be doing injustice. Hence, one might argue it 
requires comprehensive reform. 
There is also a deeper problem with the “partners in guilt” response. In 
particular, one might worry that corporate criminal fines involve a substantially 
greater degree of spillover onto the innocent than individual punishments do. 
On the one hand, we can expect that some cases of individual punishment will 
cause downstream harm to innocent third-parties (e.g. those with whom the 
defendant has a close relationship),40 but we can also expect that this kind of 
spillover will not occur in all cases of individual punishment. By contrast, for 
traditional corporate criminal fines, we can expect innocent shareholders to be 
burdened in virtually every case. Thus, spillover will occur much more 
systematically and predictability on the corporate side than it does for individual 
punishments. For this reason, simply pointing out that all punishments can lead 
to spillover is not enough to defuse the spillover objection to corporate criminal 
fines in particular. 
Accordingly, a different kind of answer to the spillover objection is 
necessary. Thomas himself notes as much when he predicts that some might 
object that his proposal does “nothing to change the fact that corporate 
punishment ‘punishes the innocent along with the guilty.’”41 As a result, when 
it comes to defending his own clawback proposal, Thomas proceeds to offer a 
different kind of answer. 
In particular, Thomas’s second answer to the spillover problem is to argue 
that “[q]uestions of guilt and innocence are wholly orthogonal to the question 
of the preferred distribution of harm attendant to corporate punishment.”42 This 
tracks his earlier observation that for corporate punishments, we can distinguish 
between the “imposition of punishment” and the “distribution of harm.”43 
Thomas’s idea is that that his clawback proposal only concerns the distribution 
                                                                                                                     
 38 Thomas, supra note 1, at 606–07. 
 39 Id. at 619. 
 40 Id.  
 41 Id. at 653 (quoting Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment 
of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2009)). 
 42 Id. at 654. 
 43 Id. at 642. 
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of punishment,44 not the logically prior question of which actors are guilty of 
which offenses. Spillover would be problematic only if it involved the 
imposition of punishment onto innocent parties.45 Distributional spillover, by 
contrast, is not similarly problematic. After all, once guilt has been ascertained 
and a punishment imposed, it is a separate question how the punishment is to be 
designed and inflicted. Accordingly, since Thomas’s clawback proposal only 
deals with what to do after the court has determined that some punishment is to 
be imposed on the corporation for a criminal offense,46 whatever spillover then 
results from the distribution of the punishment is not similarly troubling.  
Nonetheless, there are two problems with this new answer to the spillover 
problem—one dialectical, the other more substantive. The dialectical problem 
is this: If distinguishing between imposition and distribution of punishment 
were sufficient to solve the spillover problem for Thomas’s clawback proposal, 
then it would also succeed as applied to traditional corporate criminal fines. 
After all, the fact that corporate criminal fines get distributed to shareholders 
when all is said and done is also just a fact about distribution of punishment, not 
its imposition. However, we saw above that traditional corporate criminal fines 
remained problematic even so. After all, traditional corporate criminal fines 
systematically create a greater degree of spillover than individual punishments. 
As a result, if distinguishing between imposition and distribution does not 
remove the spillover problem for traditional criminal fines, one wonders how 
this distinction by itself could solve the spillover problem for other forms of 
punishment like Thomas’s clawback proposal. 
The second, more substantive problem is that the requirement of criminal 
desert—what I above called negative retributivism—places constraints not just 
on the imposition of punishment, but also on its distribution.47 In other words, 
the idea that we may not punish the innocent goes further than the following 
familiar restriction of the objects of punishment: 
 
Desert Constraint 1 (Imposition): The imposition of a given amount of 
punishment X on defendant D is just only if, in virtue of his wrongdoing, D 
deserves an amount of punishment equal to X. 
 
Beyond this rudimentary desert constraint, it is very plausible that desert 
also places outside limits on how punishment may permissibly be distributed. 
At a minimum, distributions that predominantly burden innocent parties would 
also be ruled out as unjust. More precisely, we can put the thought as follows: 
 
Desert Constraint 2 (Distribution): Where punishment X is legitimately 
imposed on a corporation for a criminal offense, it is unjust to distribute X 
                                                                                                                     
 44 Thomas, supra note 1, at 648. 
 45 Id. at 642–43. 
 46 Id. at 649. 
 47 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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in such a way that the burdens of X come to rest solely or predominantly on 
innocent parties, while those who were responsible for causing for the 
underlying criminal offense completely or substantially avoid bearing the 
burden of X. 
 
Why is this a problem? If I’m right that there is also a desert constraint on 
the distribution of punishment, then simply distinguishing between imposition 
and distribution of punishment is not by itself enough to defuse the spillover 
problem. For example, while traditional corporate criminal fines would not 
violate the first desert constraint on imposing punishment, it very plausibly 
would violate the second one, concerning distribution. After all, the burdens of 
traditional corporate criminal fines fall predominantly on innocent shareholders, 
not the parties within the corporation who are likely to have caused the 
underlying criminal offense. As a result, more is needed than distinguishing 
imposition from distribution of punishment in order to avoid the spillover 
problem. 
Fortunately for Thomas, his proposal actually has additional resources at its 
disposal. Although he doesn’t make much of them, these additional resources 
can be used to provide a more satisfying answer to the spillover problem. As a 
proposal only about how corporate punishments are to be distributed, it of 
course does not run afoul of Desert Constraint 1, concerning imposition. Rather, 
the question is whether it runs into trouble with Desert Constraint 2, concerning 
distribution.  
As it turns out, Thomas’s proposal seems to fare substantially better than 
traditional corporate criminal punishments on this score. One might be forgiven 
for thinking that making directors jointly and severally liable for corporate 
criminal fines violates Desert Constraint 2. However, this would be to forget the 
second component of Thomas’s proposal. The opportunity that directors would 
have to claw back funds from the responsible parties will substantially reduce 
the amount of spillover that innocent parties end up suffering when compared 
with traditional corporate criminal fines. Rather than allowing fines to be solely 
absorbed by innocent shareholders with the responsible parties experiencing 
little or no effect, under Thomas’s proposal, the burdens of corporate criminal 
fines would ultimately come to rest mainly on those who were responsible for 
the underlying offense.48 Although making directors jointly and severally liable 
for fines initially risks a distribution of punishment that violates Desert 
Constraint 2, Thomas’s proposal contains straightforward mechanisms that 
allow the initially unjust distribution to be rectified.49 Thus, because of the 
clawback component in Thomas’s proposal, his view in fact seems to fare better 
with respect to the spillover objection than traditional corporate criminal fines. 
I belabor this point because Thomas’s own discussion seems to undersell 
the strengths of his clawback proposal as an answer to the spillover objection. 
                                                                                                                     
 48 Thomas, supra note 1, at 645. 
 49 Id. at 647. 
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While I do not think his distinction between imposition and distribution of 
punishment provides a blanket defense of corporate criminal fines, his own 
substantive policy proposal shows that some methods of distributing 
punishment involve much less spillover than others.  
In this way, Thomas shows—perhaps more than he acknowledges—a more 
promising way to answer skeptics of corporate criminal fines. Rather than 
seeking to show that their concerns about spillover are misguided from the get-
go, the better answer is to construct mechanisms for levying corporate criminal 
fines that are more consistent with the desert constraint.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Thomas offers an intriguing attempt to improve the way in which corporate 
criminal fines operate in the real world. In this Response, I have attempted to 
show that other versions of Thomas’s proposal are also worth investigating in 
order to home in on the most optimal implementation of the sort of clawback 
mechanism he advocates. Moreover, I have attempted to show that his proposed 
clawback mechanism in fact fares better with respect to the spillover problem 
than traditional corporate criminal fines. Rather than shying away from the 
spillover problem entirely, Thomas would be well-served by claiming the 
virtues of his proposal in minimizing spillover as an additional benefit of his 
reforms compared to the status quo. 
